Abstract
Introduction
An enormous amount of servers, providing an even larger number of services, are currently available. Most of these services can only be accessed after successful authentication of the user in order to verify its identity. A classical authentication method is to send to each of these services an identity and hashed password, which is then compared with the stored verification table at server side. Such method encompasses several security problems and requires huge storage capacities. In 2000, Hwang et al. [1] introduced the smart card based authentication. Here, a registration center (RC) activates the card with some secret information, which is (partly) shared with the registered servers. During the last decade, a lot of research has been performed on developing a practical and secure authentication protocol for this type of setting.
The goal of this paper is to show an important weakness in a recently proposed protocol [2] . Besides the fact that the protocol offers resistance against the most common security attacks, it turns out that it is completely broken once there is a malicious user or a dishonest server. Moreover, any server can follow the communications with other servers and the system does not satisfy perfect forward secrecy as it claims to do. Our improved version is based on the ideas of [3] , with the inclusion of untraceability of the user.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents related work. In Section 3, we discuss the security weaknesses from [2] . Section 4 describes our protocol.
In Section 5, we analyze the security and performance of the protocol. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 6.
Related Work
In the survey [4] , an overview is given of the most important security attacks and the proposed schemes in literature for smart card based authentication on singleserver and multi-server architectures. We here focus on the last type of schemes, since they are more general and offer additional user friendliness since the user does not need to collect different identities and passwords for each service.
We can basically distinguish two types of approaches in the authentication schemes, public key based and symmetric key based schemes. Most recent examples of the first category are [5] [6] [7] . However, as public key based operations are computationally much more demanding and do not offer additional benefits, we will focus on the symmetric key based approach. Recently, Banerjee et al. [2] sh owed weaknesses in a previous authentication scheme and proposed the first scheme, solely based on xoring and hash operations, which offers protection against stolen smart card attack, replay attack, user impersonation attack, insider attack, and satisfies perfect forward secrecy. However, as we will show in the next section, they consider the adversary of the insider attacks only as an insider of the RC. A more general version of this attack is to consider the adversary also as a malicious user or dishonest server. We also show that the scheme does not satisfy perfect forward secrecy.
On the other hand, also three-factor authentication, by including biometrics into the authentication schemes, has been proposed in literature [3, [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] . In [3, 14] it is shown that the systems from [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] do not offer resistance against the well-known security attacks. In [14] , a new system is proposed, but requires a communication between server and RC for each login of the user, which is not very practical. The proposed system from [3] does not require such additional communication and is shown to be resistant against insider attacks, also for insiders as malicious users or dishonest servers. However, the system is said to satisfy anonymity, but still allows traceability of a user.
To summarize, our scheme will use ideas from [3] , but restrict to a two -factor authentication since we believe that the solution with biometrics is much more costly and can in many cases still be circumvented. However, we also include the property of user untraceability into the system.
Authentication Scheme from [2]
The authentication scheme from [2] consists of five phases, namely registration, user login, verification, password change, and smart card revocation phase. We will restrict the explanation to the first three phases, as we will use them to explain the weaknesses of the scheme. There are three types of participants into the scheme, being the user U i with the smart card, the RC, and the server S j. The RC chooses a master secret key x and a secret number y, and computes h(x||y) and h(y). These numbers are shared with the servers S j.
The same notations as in [2] are used and are summarized in Table I . After the explanation of the different phases, we show the security weaknesses of the scheme.
Table I. Notations and Definitions in this Paper

Notation
Definitions 
} to the memory of U i 's smart card and sends it to the user through a secure channel.  U i : Upon receiving the smart card, U i securely stores b. Consequently, the smart card
User Login Phase:
In this phase, the user wants to obtain access to the services. He first inserts his smart card into the reader and inputs ID i and PW i . Then, the smart card does the following actions.
* equals to the stored V i , then the user is verified and the process can be continued.
Here N i is a random nonce generated by the smart card. The login request {CID i , P ij , C 1 , C 2 } is send to the server S j .
Authentication Phase:
In this phase, server S j verifies the authentication of the request and a shared secret key between S j and U i is negotiated. S j first executes the following steps. 
Security Weaknesses
The main weakness follows from the fact that all servers share the same security material, h(y), h(x||y), with the RC. Moreover, also a malicious card user that is able to retrieve the storage material on the card can derive these values. The value h(y) is directly stored on the card and h(x||y) can be derived through E i = A i ⊕ h(x||y). As shown in the user login phase, the user is able to derive A i and E i is stored on the card.
Once h(y), h(x||y) are leaked or abused by a malicious entity (user or server), all existing smart cards should be revoked. Let us discuss several actions that become possible for an attacker. The server will authenticate this message, since the computed C 1 will match with the transmitted value, as it is derived by the constructions explained above. Next, the message {C 3 , C 4 } is computed, based on the material derived from the adversary. Consequently, the adversary can also derive the nonce N j and determine the shared secret key.
Conflict with Perfect Forward
Secrecy: The malicious entity can generate its own authentication material for any server S
Impersonation Attacks:
The adversary with knowledge of h(y), h(x||y), is also able to impersonate the two other participants of the scheme, being the server and the user.  He can impersonate a server by performing a man in the middle attack after receiving the message {CID i , P ij , C 1 , C 2 }.  He can impersonate a user since he can derive RPW i from a transmitted message {CID i , P ij , C 1 , C 2 }.  He can derive the session keys from any user by intercepting the messages send from user to server and server to user. Consequently, the system described above is completely broken for an insider attack with a server as inside attacker or a smart card stolen attack combined with an insider attack with a user as inside attacker. Moreover, it clearly does not satisfy perfect forward secrecy as claimed in [2] .
Proposed Scheme
We will use similar notations and setting as the scheme described in the previous section. Again, the RC chooses a master secret key x and a secret number y. However, now the RC computes h(x||y) and also h(SID j ||h(x)) for each server S j.. These values are send to each server individually through a secure channel.
We also distinguish the similar five phases as in the previous scheme and now describe each of them into more detail.
Registration Phase
In order to get access to the services, the user first registers with the RC as follows.  U i : The user U i chooses his identity ID i , password PW i and computes RPW i =h( b ⊕ PW i ), where b is a random number generated by U i . Then, U i sends ID i and RPW i to the RC for registration through a secure channel.  RC: After receiving this request, the RC verifies the validity of ID i . Denote by N the number of registrations performed by the user. Then, the RC computes the following steps: 
User Login Phase
Now, the user wants to obtain access to the services. He first inserts his smart card into the reader and inputs ID i and PW i . Then, the smart card does the following actions.
If ID i * equals to the transmitted ID i , then the smart card authenticates the user and the process can be further continued. Again, let N i be a random nonce generated by the smart card.
The login request {CID i ,V 1 , C 1 , C 2 } is send to the server S j .
Authentication Phase
In this phase, a secret shared key is determined by mutual authentication between server and user. The server S j starts with the following steps, using its stored secret material h(x||y) and h(SID j ||h(x)).
* equals to the transmitted V 1 , then the user is authenticated and the process can continue. A new nonce N j is determined and the following steps are executed. 2 } is send to the user U i . Now U i performs the following steps
* equals to the N i of the login request, the value SK ij is considered as a secret shared session key. A confirmation message can eventually be send from user to server.
Password Change Phase
Changing a password is possible without interaction with the RC. The user inserts the card in the smart reader, inputs its password and identity, and selects the option to change the password. If the card authenticates the user, it prompts the user for a new password PW i * and computes:
The values of C i and E i are updated and stored on the card.
Revocation of User's Lost or Stolen Card
This phase is exactly the same as in [2] and follows from the fact that the RC stores the value N, which corresponds with the number of registration requests of a user with a given identity
Security and Performance Analysis of Proposed Scheme
Security Evaluation
The main reason why the attacks from the previous scheme cannot be applied is because each server contains different security material, which is in addition different from the security material of the user. Because of the same reasons as explained in [2, 3] , the scheme is resistant against stolen smart card attack, replay attack, and user impersonation attack. We now discuss the strongest type of attacks, being the insider attacks with a user or server as adversary. We also explain the forward secrecy and anonymity feature of the scheme.
Impersonation Attacks:
We need to discuss two possible scenarios for the adversary, being a malicious inside user or a server. In the first case, the adversary cannot take over the role of server, since it does not know h(x||y), and thus cannot derive A i , required to determine N i from the transmitted tuple. This value is essential in the derivation of the secret shared session key. However, it must be said that this adversary has the capability to trace the behaviour of a particular user, since it can derive B i . On the other hand, it is not possible to link this user with an identity. So, the potential impact of this is negligible.
If the adversary represents a server, he cannot derive any useful information send to other servers since he is not aware of h(SID , ||h(x)) for other servers S j .
Perfect Forward Secrecy:
There are two long term secrets h(x) and h(x||y). The first one can be derived by the smart card of the user, the second one is stored on the server. If they are separately leaked and the other is not abused at the same time by an insider attack, the scheme obtains perfect forward secrecy because of the same reasons as explained above. As this combination of leakage and abuse is quite rare to appear, we may consider the scheme to satisfy perfect forward secrecy.
Anonymity:
In [3] , the scheme was said to satisfy anonymity. However, each message contained the static value B i . Although, this message is not directly linked with a certain identity, an adversary may still track user's behaviour, which is not always favourable for the users's privacy. In our scheme, the transmitted message {CID i ,V 1 , C 1 , C 2 } contains only dynamic material, since all values are dependent of the random none N i , which changes in each request. As mentioned before, only malicious inside users and the intended server are able to derive the static information related to a particular user.
Performance Comparison
From the proposed systems in literature on smart card based authentication for multiserver architectures, including two-factor and three-factor authentication, almost all of them are broken for the classical attacks like impersonation attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, password guessing attacks, etc. Exceptions are [3, 7, 14] .
As mentioned before the system of [7] is using elliptic curve operations and therefore requires much more computational resources. Moreover, the scheme is also very inefficient with respect to storage at the smart card, since separate key material for each different server needs to be stored at the smart card. In our system, we use the trick to have different key material between user h(x) and server h(x||y), h(SID , ||h(x)) and where the user is able to build part of the key material (i.e. h (SID , ||h(x) )) of the server.
Also the system of [14] is very inefficient with respect to our system, since the RC should be involved during the authentication process of the user. Moreover, if the RC becomes off-line for one or other reason, the protocol cannot be continued.
Since our proposed system is building on the same ideas of [3] , the performance between both systems is more or less similar. Our system requires in the computation of CID i , one additional hash and xor operation. However, it is important to note that the required operations are restricted to hash and xor operations, which are both very efficient operations in hardware.
Conclusions
In this paper, after showing a weakness in an existing system, we propose a new very efficient scheme for smart card based authentication on multi-server architecture. The scheme is resistant against the well-known security attacks, satisfies perfect forward secrecy and anonymity with untraceability. We believe that it is a very good candidate to be adopted in practice in order to assure user's authentication, obtained by the combination of the user's password and the possession of the smart card.
